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Abstract   
Allowing resale in multi-object auctions increases bidders. incentives to jointly reduce demand, because resale 
increases low-value bidders’ willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders’ willingness to pay. Therefore 
(unlike in single-object auctions), resale may reduce the seller’s revenue in multi-object auctions. However, we 
show that, under reasonable conditions, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are “complement 
strategies” for the seller – by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by selling the 
objects separately and/or not allowing resale. We also analyze how resale affects a bidder’s incentive to 
unilaterally reduce demand, and we show why allowing resale may reduce efficiency. 
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Abstract
Allowing resale in multi-object auctions increases bidders￿incentives to jointly reduce
demand, because resale increases low-value bidders￿willingness to pay and reduces high-value
bidders￿willingness to pay. Therefore (unlike in single-object auctions), resale may reduce
the seller￿ s revenue in multi-object auctions. However, we show that, under reasonable
conditions, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are ￿complement strategies￿
for the seller ￿ by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by
selling the objects separately and/or not allowing resale. We also analyze how resale a⁄ects
a bidder￿ s incentive to unilaterally reduce demand, and we show why allowing resale may
reduce e¢ ciency.
JEL Classi￿cation: D44 (auctions).
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Italy (email: pagnozzi@unina.it). I would like to thank Alberto Bennardo, Simon Board, Eric Budish, Ian
Jewitt, Paul Klemperer and Max Tse for valuable comments and suggestions, as well as seminar participants
at Bocconi University and the CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics and Institutions in Anacapri. I remain
responsible for all errors.1. Introduction
The 2002 ￿Cave Report,￿which was commissioned by the UK Government to review its spectrum
policies, recommended to allow trading of spectrum licenses ￿as soon as possible.￿ 1 Since 2003,
the US Federal Communications Commission allows leasing and trading of the spectrum licenses
it awards. The main rationale for this policy is that trading favors a more e¢ cient allocation of
the spectrum among its users. In this paper we analyze how bidders￿strategies in multi-object
auctions are a⁄ected by the possibility of trading in the aftermarket the objects acquired in the
auction, and the e⁄ect of this possibility on the seller￿ s revenue.
When an auction is followed by a resale market, a losing bidder can still obtain the auction
prize by purchasing it from a winning bidder. In single-object auctions, if bidders￿relative
valuations are known, the possibility of resale increases the seller￿ s revenue because it gives
a weak (i.e., low-value) bidder a chance to win the auction against a strong (i.e., high-value)
bidder, and so it induces him to participate in the auction and bid more aggressively (Pagnozzi,
2008).2
But in multi-object auctions bidders may also have an incentive to ￿reduce demand￿ ￿
i.e., to bid for fewer objects than they actually want, in order to pay a lower price for the
objects they do win. Demand reduction typically reduces the seller￿ s revenue and results in
an ine¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale (Wilson, 1979).3 But while demand reduction is
generally pro￿table for a weak bidder ￿ because he cannot win the auction if a higher-value
competitor bids aggressively for all the objects on sale ￿ a strong bidder may instead prefer
to win more objects rather than reduce demand, even at the cost of paying a higher price for
them. Therefore, when an auction is not followed by a resale market, demand reduction does
not necessarily take place.
However, if the objects on sale are ine¢ ciently allocated as a consequence of demand reduc-
tion, it is natural to expect bidders to trade among themselves in the aftermarket, if they are
allowed to do so.4 Speci￿cally, if trading in the aftermarket is allowed and a low-value bidder
1The ￿Review of Radio Spectrum Management￿was commissioned to Professor Martin Cave and also suggests
that auctions should become the ￿default means￿of assigning spectrum licenses.
2The literature on resale in single-object auctions includes Calzolari and Pavan (2006), Garratt and Tr￿ger
(2006), Gupta and Lebrun (1999), Hafalir and Krishna (2007), Haile (2000, 2003), Milgrom (1987), and Zheng
(2002).
3The literature on demand reduction also includes Ausubel and Cramton (1998), Back and Zender (1993),
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn (1998), Kremer and Nyborg (2004), and Noussair (1995). Kagel and Levin
(2001) and List and Lucking-Reiley (2000) provide experimental evidence of demand reduction; Weber (1997),
Wolfram (1998) and Wolak (2003) show that demand reduction a⁄ected several FCC spectrum auctions, as well
as the UK and the California electricity markets; Klemperer (2004) and Grimm et al. (2003) describe demand
reduction in the 1999 GSM spectrum auction in Germany. Milgrom (2004) provides an excellent exposition of
the literature on multi-unit auctions.
4Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) and Bose and Deltas (2002) show that bidders may also trade in the af-
termarket when some bidders cannot participate in the auction and can only acquire the objects on sale in the
2wins an object, he can resell it to a high-value bidder who reduced demand during the auction,
with both bidders making a pro￿t. So resale allows bidders to correct an ine¢ cient allocation
obtained at the end of the auction because of demand reduction, and hence it a⁄ects a strong
bidder￿ s incentive to reduce demand.
When resale is allowed, a weak bidder is willing to pay a higher price in the auction (than
when resale in not allowed) because he anticipates a positive surplus in the resale market if
he wins an object in the auction; while a strong bidder is willing to pay a lower price in the
auction (than when resale in not allowed) because she anticipates a positive surplus in the resale
market if she loses an object in the auction. It follows that, when resale is allowed, for a strong
bidder it is both more costly to outbid a weaker competitor, because the latter is willing to bid
more aggressively, and less costly to lose an object in the auction, because the strong bidder
can still acquire the object in the resale market. So the possibility of resale makes joint demand
reduction ￿ i.e., all bidders simultaneously reducing demand ￿ more attractive for bidders.
We show that, in a uniform-price auction with complete information, while demand reduction
is not always an equilibrium when resale is not allowed, when resale is allowed demand reduction
is always an equilibrium (and it is the is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in undominated
strategies). So allowing resale may induce bidders to reduce demand, thus reducing the seller￿ s
revenue.5
Uniform-price auctions are often used to allocate multiple identical objects ￿ for example,
for on-line IPOs (including the one of Google in August 2004), electricity markets, markets for
emission permits, and by the US Treasury Department to issue new securities. We analyze
uniform-price auctions for simplicity, because this is the auction mechanism in which the incen-
tive to reduce demand arises more clearly (Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). But our qualitative
result that resale may reduce the seller￿ s revenue by making demand reduction more attractive
for bidders also hold for any mechanism to allocate multiple objects in which bidders face a
trade-o⁄between winning more objects and paying lower prices. As explained above, the reason
is that, by nearing bidders￿actual valuations, resale makes it relatively more costly for a bidder
to outbid his competitors and win more of the objects on sale.
How can the seller react to the risk of demand reduction in an auction? Bundling the
objects on sale appears a natural strategy for the seller, because bundling forces bidders to win
all objects, or none at all. So bundling makes it impossible for bidders to pro￿tably reduce
demand (Anton and Yao, 1992). Unfortunately, bundling may also reduce the seller￿ s revenue
and generate an ine¢ cient allocation. This happens whenever bidders do not reduce demand if
aftermarket.
5Pagnozzi (2007) analyzes how resale a⁄ects the seller￿ s revenue when it also attracts speculators ￿ i.e., bidders
who have no use value for the objects on sale ￿ to the auction and shows that, because it increases the number
of competitors in the auction, in this case allowing resale may actually increase the seller￿ s revenue.
3the objects are sold separately. But we show that, while bundling has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the
seller￿ s revenue when resale is forbidden, when resale is allowed bundling always increases the
seller￿ s revenue in our simple model, because bidders always reduce demand if resale is allowed
and the objects are sold separately.6 Moreover, we also show that, provided bidders are not too
asymmetric, bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale are ￿complement strategies￿for
the seller ￿ by both bundling and allowing resale the seller also earns a higher revenue than:
(i) by bundling and forbidding resale, and (ii) by not bundling and forbidding resale.7 The
reason is that by allowing resale the seller induces a weak bidder to bid more aggressively (as in
a single-object auction) for both objects and, at the same time, by bundling the units on sale
he prevents a strong bidder from reacting by reducing demand.
So our analysis suggests that a seller may prefer to bundle the objects on sale in order
to increase his revenue, even if bundling may generate an ine¢ cient initial allocation of the
objects. And this is especially true when the seller cannot prevent resale. Moreover, if resale is
allowed and there are no frictions to trading in the aftermarket, resale eventually allows bidders
to correct an ine¢ cient allocation achieved by the auction (e.g., because of bundling), and so
ensures that the ￿nal allocation of the objects on sale is e¢ cient.
However, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient ￿ because, for example, bidders may
be unable to trade after the auction even if they would like to ￿ allowing resale may actually
result in an ine¢ cient ￿nal allocation of the objects on sale. The reason is that allowing resale
may still induce a strong bidder to reduce demand, only then to ￿nd herself unable to acquire
the object from a weaker bidder in the resale market.
Finally, we also analyze unilateral demand reduction by a strong bidder ￿ i.e., the possibility
that a bidder reduces demand alone, even though her opponent does not reduce demand. We
show that resale may eliminate the incentive for a strong bidder to unilaterally reduce demand,
because resale induces a weak bidder to bid relatively more aggressively on a marginal object,
thus increasing the auction price when only the strong bidder reduces demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
introduces demand reduction without resale and Section 4 analyzes how demand reduction is
6The e⁄ects of bundling by a seller of multiple objects in an auction without resale have been analyzed by
Anton and Yao (1992) and Palfrey (1983), among others. Anton and Yao (1992) show that auctioning the
objects on sale separately can reduce the seller￿ s revenue because it allows bidders to coordinate their bids and
accommodate each other. Palfrey (1983) shows that, when bidders are privately informed about their valuations,
the seller￿ s bundling decision is a⁄ected by the number of bidders: bundling increases the seller￿ s revenue with a
small number of bidders but reduces the seller￿ s revenue with a large number of bidders.
7More precisely, bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale always yields a higher seller￿ s revenue than
bundling the objects on sale and forbidding resale; while bundling the objects on sale and allowing resale yields a
higher seller￿ s revenue than selling the objects separately and forbidding resale if either (1) the weak bidder has
a su¢ ciently high valuation for at least one of the objects on sale or (2) the strong bidder does not obtain too
large a share of the gains from trade in the resale market.
4a⁄ected by the possibility of resale. The e⁄ect on the seller￿ s revenue of bundling the objects on
sale is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 considers the e⁄ects of an ine¢ cient resale market, and
Section 7 analyzes unilateral demand reduction. The last section concludes. All proofs are the
appendix.
2. The Model
Consider a sealed-bid uniform-price auction for two units of the same good with two bidders.
This is the simplest model that allows us to analyze the e⁄ects of interest. Each bidder submits
two non-negative bids, one for each unit. In a uniform-price auction, the two highest bids are
awarded the units, and the winner(s) pay for each unit won a price equal to the third-highest
bid.
We let vk
i be bidder i￿ s valuation for the kth unit he acquires. Bidder S is a strong (i.e.,
high-value) female bidder who has the highest valuation for one of the units on sale, while bidder
W is a weak (i.e., low-value) male bidder. Bidders have decreasing marginal valuations for the
units on sale ￿ i.e., v1
i ￿ v2
i ￿ and, without loss of generality, v1
S is the highest valuation. So
bidders valuations are:







Notice that no bidder necessarily has the highest valuation for both units (i.e., each bidder may
have one of the two highest valuations).
We make the following assumption on valuations, which is standard in the literature on
demand reduction (e.g., Wilson, 1979).
Assumption 1. Valuations are common knowledge among bidders, but the seller does not know
bidders￿valuations.
This assumption implies that the identity of the strong bidder and the ex-post e¢ cient allocation
of the units on sale is common knowledge among bidders. Therefore, in our model resale is not
caused by uncertainty in valuations, or by a change in the order of bidders￿valuations after the
auction (as in Haile, 2000, 2003). Moreover, Assumption 1 allows us to abstract from issues of
information transmission between the auction and the resale market, that are not the focus of
this paper.
To analyze the strategies that the seller can adopt to increase his revenue, we assume the
seller can allow or forbid resale and bundle the units on sale or sell them separately.
If resale is allowed, bidders always trade in the aftermarket when there are gains from trade
obtainable.
5Assumption 2. When bidders trade in the resale market, bidder W obtains a share ￿ of the
gains from trade and bidder S obtains a share (1 ￿ ￿) of the gains from trade, where 0 < ￿ ￿ 1.
Therefore, the outcome of bargaining between the two bidders in the resale market is given
by the Nash bargaining solution with weights ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿), where the disagreement point is
represented by bidders￿outside options. The parameter ￿ is a measure of bidders￿bargaining
power. We assume that ￿ > 0 (i.e., that the weak bidder always obtains at least some of the
gains from trade) in order to make the resale market relevant. When bidders trade a unit in the
resale market, the outside option of the bidder who is trying to acquire the unit is normalized
to zero, while the outside option of the bidder who won the unit in the auction is equal to his
valuation. So a bidder￿ s valuation is relevant in the resale market and also a⁄ects his bargaining
power. This implies that the gains from trading a unit in the resale market are equal to the
di⁄erence between the two bidders￿valuations, and that the resale price is located somewhere
between the two bidders￿valuations, with the exact position determined by ￿.
We de￿ne a bidder￿ s ￿willingness to pay￿for a unit in the auction as the highest auction
price the bidder is happy to pay for the unit. When resale is not allowed, a bidder￿ s willingness
to pay is equal to his valuation. When resale is allowed, a bidder￿ s willingness to pay for a unit is
represented by the price at which he can buy or sell the unit in the resale market (e.g., Milgrom,
1987).







i is bidder i￿ s bid for
the ￿rst unit and b2
i is his bid for the second unit, i = S;W. We assume that participating in
the auction and bidding are costless and we only consider undominated strategies. We say there
is demand reduction if a bidder￿ s bid for a unit is lower than his willingness to pay for the unit.
We make the following assumption that requires that the quantity demanded by a bidder is
not increasing in price:
Assumption 3. The bids of bidder i for the two units must be such that b1
i ￿ b2
i.
Bidders jointly reduce demand if, for the second unit on sale, they both bid a price which
is lower than their willingness to pay (for the second unit) and lower than their opponent￿ s
willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit. As we are going to show, when bidders jointly reduce
demand each bidder wins one of the units on sale and the auction price is equal to the highest
between the two bidders￿bids for the second unit.8
To simplify the analysis, we assume that, if in equilibrium bidders jointly reduce demand,
they both bid zero for the second unit on sale ￿ i.e., they coordinate on the equilibrium with
joint demand reduction that gives them the highest pro￿t, which is the equilibrium with an
8Bidders coordinating their behavior to reduce demand in concert is often described as tacit collusion. Uni-
lateral demand reduction, in which a bidder reduces demand to one unit even if the other bidder does not, is
discussed in Section 7.
6auction price equal to zero. This is a natural assumption because such an equilibrium Pareto
dominates, from the bidders￿point of view, any other equilibrium with joint demand reduction
but a positive auction price.9 Our results do not hinge on this assumption.
Finally, we make the following assumptions that simpli￿es the description of equilibrium
bidding strategies.
Assumption 4. When indi⁄erent between bidding a price equal to his willingness to pay for a
unit and bidding a di⁄erent price, a bidder bids a price equal to his willingness to pay.
Assumption 5. When indi⁄erent between reducing demand and not reducing demand, a bidder
reduces demand.
None of our results hinge on these assumptions.
In Section 6, to analyze the e⁄ects of an ine¢ cient resale market, we assume that with
positive probability bidders are unable to trade after the auction. In Section 7, to simplify the
analysis of unilateral demand reduction, we further assume that there is an arbitrarily small
cost that bidders have to pay to trade in the resale market.
3. Equilibria without Resale
It is well known that, in a uniform-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each
bidder to bid his valuation for the ￿rst unit (see, e.g., Milgrom, 2004); hence bidders never
reduce demand for the ￿rst unit.10 Moreover, bidding more than one￿ s willingness to pay for




i , i = S;W.11 But bidders
may ￿nd it pro￿table to reduce demand and bid less than their willingness to pay for the second
unit, in order to pay a lower price for the ￿rst unit and so obtain a higher pro￿t (Wilson,
1979; Ausubel and Cramton, 1998). The logic is the same as the standard textbook logic for
a monopsonist withholding demand: buying an additional unit increases the price paid for the
￿rst, inframarginal, unit.
In this section, we assume that the seller does not allow resale after the auction. In this
case, a bidder￿ s willingness to pay is equal to his valuation for a unit. We analyze the conditions
9An equilibrium Pareto dominates another equilibrium from the bidders￿point of view if in the ￿rst equilibrium
at least one bidder is strictly better o⁄ and no bidder is worse o⁄ than in the second equilibrium.
10A bidder￿ s ￿rst-unit bid a⁄ects the auction price only when it is the third-highest bid, in which case the
bidder wins no unit and the price is irrelevant to her. Therefore, the ￿rst-unit bid only determines whether a
bidder wins the unit, and not the price she pays for it. And exactly as in a single-unit second-price auction, it is
a dominant strategy for a bidder to bid her valuation for the ￿rst unit, so that she wins the unit if and only if it
is pro￿table for her to do so ￿ i.e., if and only if her valuation is no lower than the auction price.
11Because we exclude dominated strategies, we do not consider equilibria in which one bidder reduces demand
because her opponent bids a very high price, higher than his own willingness to pay for a unit, expecting not to
pay for it.
7required for a Nash equilibrium with joint demand reduction in undominated strategies, in which
both bidders bid zero for the second unit on sale in the auction.
When v1
W > v2
S, each bidder has one of the two highest valuations. In this case, it is a
weakly dominant strategy for a bidder to reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit, when
her opponent bids his valuation for the ￿rst unit. The reason is that each bidder always wins
a single unit (because her valuation for the second unit is lower than her opponent￿ s valuation,
and hence than his bid, for the ￿rst unit); hence the second-unit bid only a⁄ects the auction
price and each bidder is better o⁄making the lowest possible bid for the second unit. Therefore,
joint demand reduction is the unique equilibrium that do not involve dominated strategies.
Now assume that v1
W < v2
S. First notice that it is still a weakly dominant strategy for bidder
W to reduce demand and bid zero for the second unit. This is because bidder W can never win
more than one unit (because his valuation for the second unit is lower than bidder S￿ s bid for
the ￿rst unit). Therefore, even in this case bidder W￿ s bid for the second unit can only a⁄ect
the price he pays, and not whether he wins the second unit or not.
So whether joint demand reduction is an equilibrium crucially depends on bidder S. If she
does not reduces demand, bidder S wins both units at price v1
W each (which is bidder W￿ s bid
for the ￿rst unit), and obtains a pro￿t of v1
S + v2
S ￿ 2v1
W. While, if bidder S reduces demand
too, she wins one unit at price zero and obtains a pro￿t of v1
S. Therefore, bidder S prefers to
reduce demand together with bidder W if and only if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S.
Lemma 1. Consider a uniform-price auction in which resale is not allowed.
(i) If 2v1
W ￿ v2
S, the unique equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated















W, the unique equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated













Notice that Assumption 4 allows us to neglect other equilibria in undominated strategies
that are essentially identical to the equilibrium in part (ii) of Lemma 1 (because, given bidder





S, there are multiple equilibria that result in di⁄erent outcomes. For example,
depending on bidders￿valuations, the auction may also have an equilibrium in which both bidders










Figure 3.1: Bidders￿valuations for which joint demand reduction takes place in equilibrium
when resale is not allowed.
involves weakly dominated strategies and is also Pareto dominated, from bidders￿point of view,
by the equilibrium with joint demand reduction, because both bidders obtain a strictly higher
pro￿t by bidding zero for the second unit. More generally, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1,
when it exists, the ￿joint demand reduction￿equilibrium Pareto dominates, from bidders￿point
of view, all other possible equilibria.
Figure 3.1 shows for which values of v1
S and v2
W the auction has the ￿joint demand reduction￿
equilibrium described in Lemma 1. Bidder S wins both units on sale in equilibrium if and only
if she has a much higher valuation than bidder W for both units on sale, so that she prefers to
win two units at a higher price, rather than reduce demand to one unit and keep the auction
price low. Otherwise, bidders jointly reduce demand and each of them wins one of the units on
sale at price zero.
In other words, joint demand reduction takes place in equilibrium if bidders are relatively
symmetric and their valuations are not too far from each other ￿ i.e., demand reduction requires
bidder W to have a relatively high valuation for the ￿rst unit and bidder S to have a relatively
low valuation for the second unit. In this case, even if bidder S has the highest valuation for
both units, it is not pro￿table for bidder S to win the second unit because she has to pay a high
price to outbid bidder W in the auction, and the second unit is not particularly valuable for her
anyway. So bidder S prefers to keep the auction price low by allowing bidder W to win one of
9the units on sale.
Corollary 1. When resale is not allowed, joint demand reduction takes place in equilibrium if
and only if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S.
Notice that demand reduction is always an equilibrium if the units on sale are perfectly
divisible and bidders can submit continuous bids (see Wilson, 1979, who considers the case of
common values). By contrast, in our model demand reduction is not always an equilibrium
because quantities and bids are discrete ￿ i.e., bidders submit a ￿nite number of price-quantity
pairs rather than a continuous demand function (Kremer and Nyborg, 2004).
Demand reduction harms the seller. If v2
S > 2v1
W, bidders do not reduce demand and the
auction￿ s price and the seller￿ s revenue are equal to 2v1
W ￿ i.e., twice the third-highest valuation
for a unit.12 By contrast, if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S, both bidders reduce demand to one unit, and the seller￿ s
revenue is equal to zero. However, with demand reduction, the auctions ends with an ine¢ cient
allocation of the units, and bidders are willing to trade among themselves after the auction.
This may a⁄ect the seller￿ s revenue because, as we are going to show in the next section, a
bidder￿ s incentive to reduce demand in the auction depends on whether he can acquire in the
aftermarket a unit that he loses in the auction to a bidder with a lower valuation.
4. Resale and Demand Reduction
After the auction, there are gains from trade whenever a bidder wins a unit on sale even if his
opponent has a higher valuation. In this case, if resale is allowed, the auction winner resells the
unit to the loser, and bidders equally share the gains from trade. Therefore, bidders￿willingness
to pay in the auction depends on the price at which they can acquire or resell a unit in the
aftermarket.









S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W (since bidder W obtains a share ￿ of the gains from
trade). So this is the price at which bidder S can acquire the ￿rst unit in the aftermarket.
What about the other unit? First assume that v2
S > v1
W. If bidder W wins one unit, he
resells it to bidder S at price ￿v2
S+(1 ￿ ￿)v1
W. So this is the price at which bidder S can acquire
the second unit in the aftermarket. While if bidder S wins both units, there is no trade in the
aftermarket. Hence, when resale is allowed and v2
S > v1
W, bidders￿total surplus as a function
of the number of units they win in the auction (including the surplus they anticipate from the
12Since there is no cost of bidding, we are assuming that bidder W follows the weakly dominant strategy of
bidding his valuation for the ￿rst unit on sale, even if he know he will eventually lose the auction.
10resale market and excluding the auction price) is equal to:13
No unit One unit Two unit


































If, on the other hand, v2
S < v1
W and bidder S wins both units, he resells the second one to
bidder W at price v2







S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W (since bidder S obtains a share
(1 ￿ ￿) of the gains from trade). So this is the price at which bidder W can acquire the second
unit in the aftermarket. While there is no trade in the aftermarket if each bidder wins one unit.
Hence, when resale is allowed and v2
S < v1
W, bidders￿total surplus as a function of the number
of units they win in the auction (including the surplus they anticipate from the resale market
and excluding the auction price) is equal to:14
No unit One unit Two units




















S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W
Bidders￿marginal willingness to pay for a unit is given by the incremental value of obtaining
a unit. So a bidder￿ s willingness to pay in the auction for the kth unit is given by the di⁄erence
between his total surplus if he wins k units and his total surplus if he wins k ￿ 1 units, that is
(both when v2
S > v1
W and when v2
S < v1
W):15
1st unit 2nd unit
S ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W
W ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W
13Let p be the auction price per unit. If bidder W wins both units, bidder S acquires them in the aftermarket





































￿2p from reselling the two units. If each bidder wins one unit, bidder S obtains
a pro￿t of v
1




S ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v
1
W from the unit she
acquires in the aftermarket; while bidder W obtains a total pro￿t of ￿v
2
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v
1
W ￿p from reselling one unit.





bidder W obtains no pro￿t.
14If any bidder i wins two units, her total pro￿t is equal to her valuation for the ￿rst unit (i.e., v
1
i ) minus
the auction price, plus the price at which she resells the second unit to the other bidder in the aftermarket (i.e.,
￿v
1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v
2
W for bidder W and ￿v
2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v
1
W for bidder S). If any bidder i wins no unit, she then buys
one unit in the aftermarket and her total pro￿t is equal to her valuation for the ￿rst unit (i.e., v
1
i ) minus the
resale price at which she buys it from the other bidder (i.e., ￿v
2
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v
1
W for bidder W and ￿v
1




15Equivalently, bidders￿willingness to pay can be obtained by noticing that a bidder who has a lower valuation
than his opponent for a unit is willing to pay for that unit an auction price equal to the price at which he can
resell the unit in the aftermarket; while a bidder who has a higher valuation than his opponent for a unit is willing
to pay for that unit an auction price equal to the price at which she can buy the unit in the aftermarket.
11Notice that the possibility of resale alters the structure of bidders￿valuations. Indeed, due to
resale: (i) one of the two bidders has a higher willingness to pay for the second unit than for the
￿rst unit (i.e., there are increasing marginal values), and (ii) regardless of bidders￿valuations,
no bidder has the highest willingness to pay for both units.
Recall from Section 3 that, when resale is not allowed, the auction does not have an equi-
librium with joint demand reduction if bidders are relatively asymmetric, because in this case
bidder S strictly prefers to outbid bidder W. But the possibility of resale reduces the asymmetry
between bidders by nearing their willingness to pay. This makes joint demand reduction more
attractive for bidders. And, as the next lemma shows, with resale it is always an equilibrium
for bidders to jointly reduce demand.
Lemma 2. When resale is allowed, the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium in weakly undom-
inated strategies (satisfying Assumption 4) is for bidder S to bid bS =
￿
￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W; 0
￿
and for bidder W to bid bW =
￿
￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W; 0
￿
￿ i.e., joint demand reduction.
As in Lemma 1, the equilibrium with joint demand reduction and zero price Pareto dom-
inates, from bidders￿ point of view, any other possible equilibrium in undominated strate-
gies.16 The reason is that, when joint demand reduction is an equilibrium, each bidder ob-
tains a strictly higher pro￿t by winning one unit at price zero, rather than by paying a pos-
itive auction price, even if this allows her to win both units on sale. Moreover, Assumption
4 allows us to neglect equilibria that are essentially identical to the equilibrium in Lemma











S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W
￿
for the ￿rst unit and bidder W is indi⁄erent










S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W
￿
for the ￿rst unit.
The intuition for the result in Lemma 2 is straightforward. With joint demand reduction,
each bidder wins one of the units on sale in the auction. When v1
W > v2
S bidders do not trade
after the auction. But in this case, as when resale is not allowed, no bidder can increase his
pro￿t by outbidding the other bidder; hence bidders strictly prefer to keep the auction price as
low as possible. When v2
S > v1
W, bidder S buys the second unit from bidder W in the resale
market. Recall from Lemma 1 that, when resale is not allowed, demand reduction takes place
in equilibrium if and only if bidder W is willing to pay a high price for the ￿rst unit, and bidder
S is not willing to pay a high price for the second unit ￿ i.e., if and only if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S. But
the possibility of resale increases bidder W￿ s willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit up to the price
at which he can resell it in the aftermarket. And, at the same time, resale reduces bidder S￿ s
16The auction has other possible equilibria in undominated strategies. For example, it is an equilibrium for
both bidders to bid their willingness to pay for the two units. And there are also equilibria in weakly dominated
strategies ￿ for example, bidder W bidding a price higher than bidder S￿ s willingness to pay for both units and
bidder S bidding zero and then buying in the resale market.
12willingness to pay for the second unit, because bidder S has the option of buying the second
unit in the aftermarket if she does not win it in the auction.17 For both these reasons, demand
reduction is more pro￿table for bidder S.
So bidder S always prefers to win one unit in the auction at price zero and possibly purchase
the second unit in the resale market, rather than raise the auction price to win both units in
the auction. And clearly bidder W also prefers to win one unit in the auction at price zero and
resell it in the aftermarket, rather than outbid bidder S and win two units (in which case he
obtains a pro￿t of zero on the second unit and reduces his pro￿t on the ￿rst unit).
Lemma 2 shows that resale induces bidders to reduce demand even if they have no incentive
to reduce demand when resale is not allowed. Therefore, if v2
S > 2v1
W the possibility of resale
reduces the auction price and the seller￿ s revenue from 2v1
W to zero. By contrast, when 2v1
W ￿ v2
S
bidders jointly reduce demand regardless of the presence of resale, yielding no revenue for the
seller. So we have the following result.
Proposition 1. In a multi-unit uniform-price auction, allowing resale (weakly) reduces the
seller￿ s revenue.
As in a single-unit auction, resale induces a weak bidder to bid more aggressively (Pagnozzi,
2008). But with multiple units on sale, this increases bidder S￿ s incentive to reduce demand
jointly with bidder W, because outbidding bidder W becomes more costly. And demand reduc-
tion reduces the seller￿ s revenue. Moreover, resale makes an ine¢ cient allocation in the auction
(i.e., bidder W winning a unit even if he has a lower valuation than bidder S) more attractive
for bidders, because the ine¢ cient allocation can be recti￿ed in the aftermarket.
Example 1. Assume v1
S = v2
S = 10, v1
W = 2, v2
W = 0, and ￿ = 1
2. Without resale, bidder S
prefers to outbid bidder W and win two units at price 2 each, rather than reduce demand and
win one unit at price 0. So the seller￿ s revenue is 4. With resale, bidder W is willing to pay
up to 6 for the ￿rst unit and bidder S is willing to pay up to 5 for the ￿rst unit. Hence, it is
an equilibrium for S to bid (5;0) and for W to bid (6;0), in which case each bidder wins one
unit, the seller￿ s revenue is 0 and bidder W resells to bidder S in the aftermarket at price 6. (If
bidder S deviates and outbids bidder W to win 2 units in the auction, she raises the auction
price to 6 and obtains a pro￿t of 8 rather than 14.) Clearly, there is no other equilibrium in
undominated strategies in which a bidder obtains a strictly higher total pro￿t.
17In the terminology of Haile (2003), bidder W bids more aggressively because of the ￿resale seller e⁄ect￿and
bidder S bids less aggressively because of the ￿resale buyer e⁄ect.￿
135. Bundling
Bundling the units on sale appears a natural reaction for the seller to the risk of demand
reduction, because bundling makes it impossible for bidders to pro￿tably reduce demand in the
auction (see, e.g., Anton and Yao, 1992).18 However, as we are going to show, without resale
bundling has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the seller￿ s revenue. In fact, when resale is not allowed,
although bundling increases the seller￿ s revenue if it prevents bidders from reducing demand, it
reduces the seller￿ s revenue if bidders do not reduce demand when the units are sold separately.
So should the seller bundle the units on sale when resale is allowed? And if the seller can
credibly forbid resale, should he do so in order to prevent demand reduction by bidders? We
address these questions in the following sections.
5.1. Bundling without Resale
First assume that resale is not allowed. If the two units are sold separately (as assumed in






W if bidders do not reduce demand (i.e., if v2
S > 2v1
W);
0 if bidders reduce demand (i.e., if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S).
Suppose instead that the seller auctions the two units bundled together, awarding them to the
bidder who submits the highest bid for the bundle at a price equal to the second-highest bid.
(In practice, in this case the seller runs a second-price auction for a single object.) Bundling
a⁄ects the seller￿ s revenue when bidders do not reduce demand, because it makes the auction
price for the two units depend on both bidder W￿ s valuations, rather than only on his highest
one. However, bundling also eliminates bidders￿incentives to reduce demand (Anton and Yao,
1992). Speci￿cally, when the units are bundled and resale is not allowed, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for each bidder to bid the sum of his valuations for the two units, and the seller￿ s revenue











So without resale, bundling does not necessarily increase the seller￿ s revenue: the e⁄ect of
bundling on the auction price depends on whether or not bidders jointly reduce demand when










18In our analysis, we assume the seller￿ s only available strategies are to bundle the units on sale and allow or
forbid resale. This is an extreme assumption. If the seller knows the exact bidders￿valuations and can set a reserve
price, his optimal strategy is to set a reserve price equal to the highest bidders￿valuations for the two units, thus
obtaining the whole bidders￿surplus. And even if the seller does not know the exact bidders￿valuations, there
are perhaps more complex mechanisms that would allow him to extract more of the bidders￿surplus. But, in the
real world, the seller￿ s information is very uncertain, setting a credible reserve price is often extremely di¢ cult,
and more complex mechanisms are even harder to implement.





S) ￿ i.e., if bidders do not reduce demand (reduce demand) without bundling.
In addition to its e⁄ect on the auction price, another potential drawback of bundling is that
it can reduce e¢ ciency. Indeed, bundling generates an ine¢ cient allocation of the units on sale
if a bidder has a higher valuation than his opponent for one of the units, but a lower valuation
for the bundle. In this case, when the units are bundled this bidder wins no unit, while it would
be e¢ cient to award one unit to each bidder.19;20
5.2. Bundling with Resale
Now consider the seller￿ s revenue when resale is allowed. To make the analysis interesting, we
assume that bidders can trade the two units separately in the resale market, even if the units
are bundled in the auction.21 Hence, if the seller bundles the two units and a bidder with a
lower valuation than his opponent for any of the units wins the auction, the two bidders trade
in the resale market.
When bidder S has the highest valuations for both units on sale, she can buy them in the
resale market at prices ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W and ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W respectively. And bidder W
can resell the two units at these same prices. On the other hand, when bidder W has a higher
valuation than bidder S for one of the units on sale, bidder W can buy the ￿rst unit in the resale
market at price ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W and sell the second unit in the resale market at price ￿v1
S +
(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W, while bidder S can buy the ￿rst unit in the resale market at price ￿v1
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W
and sell the second unit in the resale market at price ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W. Therefore, both when
v1
S > v1
W and when v1
S < v1












for the two units in the auction. And because it is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder















By contrast, if the seller auctions the units separately and resale is allowed, by Lemma 2 both
bidders reduce demand and the seller￿ s revenue is equal to zero. Hence, we have the following
result.












S. In this case, bidder W wins
none of the units on sale with bundling, while it would be e¢ cient for him to win one of the units.
20Moreover, if there are entry or bidding costs, bundling may discourage the participation in the auction of the
bidder with the lowest valuation for the bundle ￿ while this bidder may participate if he could win a single unit.
For example, Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) show that rationing ￿ i.e., dividing the auction prize among multiple
winners, which can be interpreted as selling the units separately in our model ￿ may attract weak bidders to the
auction and raise the auction price. See also Milgrom (2004).
21If the units cannot be sold separately in the resale market, our model is analogous to a single object auction
with resale (see, e.g., Pagnozzi, 2008).
15Lemma 4. When resale is allowed, bundling strictly increases the seller￿ s revenue.
So, when resale is allowed, the seller always obtains a higher revenue by bundling the two
units on sale, because bundling eliminates bidders￿ incentives to reduce demand, while this
incentive is always present if the units are sold separately. In other words, in contrast to a
situation in which resale is not allowed, when resale is allowed bundling is always an e⁄ective
strategy for the seller to prevent bidders from jointly reducing demand and to raise the auction
price.
5.3. Bundling and Allowing Resale
Assume now that the seller can prevent bidders from reselling after the auction. Should the
seller do so to discourage demand reduction or should he instead bundle the units on sale?
The answer is that, typically, the seller should not prevent resale and should bundle the
units on sale, because bundling and allowing resale are complement strategies for the seller.
First, as shown by Lemma 4, when resale is allowed bundling increases the seller￿ s revenue.
Second, exactly as in a single-object auction, when the units are bundled allowing resale increases
the seller￿ s revenue, because it induces the bidder with the lowest total valuation to bid more
aggressively (Pagnozzi, 2008). Third, as proven in the next proposition, the seller￿ s revenue is
also higher in an auction with resale and bundling than in an auction without resale in which
the units are sold separately if: (1) bidder / W has a su¢ ciently high valuation for at least one
of the units or (2) bidder W can obtain a su¢ ciently large share of the gains from trade in the
resale market.
Proposition 2. Bundling the units on sale and allowing resale yields a higher seller￿ s revenue
than: (i) selling the units separately and allowing resale, and (ii) bundling and forbidding resale.
Bundling the units on sale and allowing resale also yields a higher seller￿ s revenue than selling
the units separately and forbidding resale if: (1) 2v1
W ￿ v2










The intuition is that, by simultaneously bundling the units on sale and allowing resale,
the seller induces the bidder with the lowest valuation to bid more aggressively because of the
option to resell in the aftermarket and, at the same time, he prevents the bidder with the
highest valuation from reacting to this strategy by reducing demand. And even if bundling
makes the auction price also depend on the weak bidder￿ s lowest willingness to pay for a single
unit, allowing resale increases this willingness to pay if the weak bidder has enough bargaining
power in the resale market. Therefore, if bidders are not too asymmetric, the seller manages to
obtain the advantages of both resale and bundling, without su⁄ering from the drawbacks that
these strategies may create.
16Of course, if both bidder W￿ s valuations and his bargaining power in the resale market are
much lower than bidder S￿ s, bidder W is unable to obtain a large surplus by reselling to bidder
S; hence allowing resale does not induce him to bid much more aggressively than without resale.
In this case, bundling and allowing resale may reduce the seller￿ s revenue. The reason is that
bidder S does not reduce demand when the units are sold separately and resale is not allowed,
and bidder W￿ s marginal losing bid is higher when the units are sold separately and resale is not
allowed than when the units are bundled and resale is allowed, because his marginal losing bid in
the former situation only depends on his highest valuation (rather than on both his valuations)
and the option to resell after the auction is not particularly valuable. But notice that condition
(2) in Proposition 2 is always satis￿ed if bidders equally share the gains from trade in the resale
market (i.e., if ￿ = 1




As regards the additional potential drawback of bundling, even if bundling results in an
ine¢ cient allocation in the auction, resale allows bidders to correct the allocation in the after-
market and eventually achieve e¢ ciency. So resale also eliminates the risk of ine¢ ciency due to
bundling.23
6. Ine¢ cient Resale Market
In Section 4, we have shown that resale may reduce the seller￿ s revenue. However, it is usually
claimed that the possibility of resale increases e¢ ciency, because it allows bidders to exploit
further gains from trade after the auction, thus ensuring that the units on sale are e¢ ciently
allocated eventually.
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the resale market is always e¢ cient, because
bidders are capable of exploiting all pro￿table trade opportunities after the auction. In this
section we consider the possibility that the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient. Speci￿cally,
we assume that with a strictly positive probability (1 ￿ p) bidders are unable to trade after the
auction ￿ i.e., that bidders can only trade in the resale market with probability p < 1 if they
are willing to do so. To simplify the analysis, we also assume that v2
S > v1
W, so that it is e¢ cient
to allocate both units to bidder S. All other assumptions are as in our main model.
If bidder W wins one of the units on sale in the auction, with probability phe resells it to
bidder S at price ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W. And if bidder W also wins a second unit in the auction,
22And the closer are bidder W￿ s valuations for the two units, the lower is the value of ￿ needed to satisfy
condition (2).
23If there are entry or bidding costs, even when resale is allowed bundling may prevent the participation in the
auction of a weak bidder who expects to lose against a strong bidder. But because in this case the weak bidder
participates only if he expects the strong bidder to reduce demand when the units are sold separately, even with
bidding costs bundling does not reduce the seller￿ s revenue when resale is allowed.
17with probability p he resells it to bidder S at price ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W. Therefore, bidder W￿ s
willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit in the auction is increased by an amount equal to his expected
surplus in the resale market if he wins one unit ￿ i.e., by the resale price minus his valuation
for the ￿rst unit, ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W ￿ v1
W, times the probability that resale takes place, p. And
bidder W￿ s willingness to pay for the second unit is increased by an amount equal to the surplus
he expects to obtain from the second unit in the resale market ￿ i.e., by the resale price minus
his valuation for the second unit, ￿v1
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W ￿v2
W, times the probability that resale takes
place, p.
By contrast, bidder S￿ s willingness to pay for the second unit in the auction is reduced by
an amount equal to her expected surplus in the resale market if bidder W wins one unit ￿
i.e., by her valuation for the second unit minus the resale price, v2
S ￿ ￿v2
S ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W, times
the probability that resale takes place, p. And bidder S￿ s willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit
is reduced by an amount equal to her additional expected surplus in the resale market if she
does not win the ￿rst unit ￿ i.e., by her valuation for the ￿rst unit minus the resale price,
v1
S ￿ ￿v1
S ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W, times the probability that resale takes place, p.
Summing up, bidders￿willingness to pay for each unit in the auction is equal to:
1st unit 2nd unit
S v1



























Compared to a situation in which bidders are always able to trade after the auction (i.e.,
p = 1), if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient bidder W is willing to pay a lower
price in the auction while bidder S is willing to pay a higher price in the auction, because
both bidders expect to obtain a lower surplus in the resale market. This reduces, but does
not eliminate, bidder S￿ s incentive to reduce demand and try to acquire one unit in the resale
market. Speci￿cally, bidder S still prefers to reduce demand and win only one unit in the auction
at price zero rather than outbid bidder W to win two units, if the sum of her valuation for the
￿rst unit and her expected surplus in the resale market is higher than her pro￿t from winning
two units in the auction at the cost of rasing the auction price up to bidder W￿ s willingness to
pay for the ￿rst unit.
Lemma 5. When resale is allowed but bidders are only able to trade after the auction with
probability p, it is an equilibrium for bidder S to bid bS =
￿
v1




















￿ i.e., joint demand reduction ￿ if and







18Not surprisingly, demand reduction requires that the probability of ine¢ ciency in the resale
market is not too large. Otherwise bidder S strictly prefers to outbid bidder W in the auction,
rather than allow him to win one unit to keep the auction price low, in the hope of being able to
acquire that unit in the resale market. Therefore, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient,
it is less likely that bidders reduce demand and that the seller￿ s revenue is reduced to zero.
However, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient, allowing resale may actually reduce
e¢ ciency. To see this, recall from Section 3 that, when resale is not allowed, bidders do not
reduce demand and the auction is e¢ cient if and only if v2
S > 2v1
W. But then in this case
allowing resale may induce bidders to reduce demand during the auction, even if they may then
be unable to trade in the resale market.
Proposition 3. If v2
S > 2v1






W), allowing resale induces bidders to reduce
demand and, with probability (1 ￿ p), it results in an ine¢ cient ￿nal allocation of the units on
sale.
Therefore, it is not necessarily true that allowing resale increases e¢ ciency. Although resale
may increase e¢ ciency after the auction, it also a⁄ects bidders￿strategies during the auction.
And allowing resale may result in an ine¢ cient allocation at the end of the auction, even when
bidders may be unable to trade and achieve an e¢ cient allocation in the aftermarket.
7. Unilateral Demand Reduction
In this section, we analyze how resale a⁄ects a strong bidder￿ s incentive to unilaterally reduce
demand ￿ i.e., to bid zero for the second unit on sale ￿ even if her opponent does not reduce
demand and bids his willingness to pay for both units. Clearly, this is not an equilibrium
strategy for the second bidder, because when a strong bidder reduces demand it is a best reply
for a weak bidder to reduce demand too. However, in the real world bidders are often unable or
unwilling to coordinate their strategy and simultaneously reduce demand, and cannot always act
on the expectation that their opponents will reduce demand.24 And there may also be exogenous
24For example, in the German 3G spectrum auction in 2000 bidders seem to have been unable to coordinate
their strategies on a mutually pro￿table demand reduction (Klemperer, 2004). Cramton (2002) writes that, in
the US Nationwide Narrowband spectrum auction in 1994, ￿[t]he largest bidder, PageNet reduced its demand
from three of the large licences to two, at a point when prices were still well below its marginal valuation for
the third unit. [It] felt that if it continued to demand a third license, it would drive up the prices on all the
others to disadvantageously high levels.￿This appears to have been unilateral behavior, rather than (attempted)
coordinated behavior, since there is no suggestion that PageNet expected any other bidder to respond by reducing
demand, nor that any other bidder did so. Cramton (2002) also provides evidence of unilateral demand reduction
in the US C-Block spectrum auction in 1995. Wolak (2003) analyzes the California Electricity Crisis in January
2001 and shows that suppliers had an incentive to unilaterally raise prices, although there is no evidence that
they coordinated their actions. This suggest that the crisis may have been generated by a unilateral exercise of
market power.
19reasons that induce a weak bidder not to reduce demand. So it is arguably worth considering
the possibility of a unilateral choice to reduce demand by a bidder, when her opponent does
not reduce demand, even if this assumes that her opponent does not follow a pro￿t-maximizing
strategy.
In order to explore this issue, we assume that v2
S > v1
W and that bidder W never reduces
demand (i.e., that he follows a strategy of always bidding his willingness to pay for both units),
and we analyze whether bidder S has an incentive to reduce demand unilaterally anyway.
We also assume there is an arbitrarily small ￿xed resale cost c that bidder S pays for each
unit traded in the resale market. This can be interpreted as either a transaction cost or a waiting
cost (due to discounting of future surplus) that a bidder pays if she buys a unit later in the resale
market, rather than earlier in the auction. This assumption allows us to simplify the analysis
because it implies that, for a given resale price, bidder S has a higher willingness to pay in the
auction than bidder W. We assume that c ￿ 0, so that trading in the resale market is always
pro￿table after bidder W wins a unit in the auction.
With a resale cost, bidders willingness to pay in the auction is:
1st unit 2nd unit
S ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W + c ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W + c
W ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W ￿ c ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W ￿ c
It may be expected that, when resale is allowed, unilateral demand reduction is more prof-
itable for bidder S, because resale allows bidder S to purchase the second unit in the aftermarket
if she does not win it during the auction. And, therefore, it may be expected that allowing resale
always increases bidder S￿ s incentive to unilaterally reduce demand. But this is not the case.
The reason is that resale increases bidder W￿ s willingness to pay for the second unit, and it
increases it relatively more than his willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit, because bidder W can
resell a second unit to bidder S at a high price (which depends on v1
S). It follows that, when
resale is allowed, it is less pro￿table for bidder S to unilaterally reduce demand, because when
she does so she can only reduce the auction price down to bidder W￿ s bid for the second unit
on sale, which is relatively higher due to his high willingness to pay.
Lemma 6. Assume bidder W does not reduce demand. When resale is allowed, bidder S has
no incentive to reduce demand unilaterally.
By contrast, when resale is not allowed, bidder S may strictly prefer to unilaterally reduce
demand. To see this, assume that bidder W bids his valuation for both units ￿ i.e., v1
W for the
￿rst unit and v2
W for the second unit. If bidder S does not reduce demand unilaterally, she wins
both units at price v1
W each, and obtains a pro￿t of v1
S+v2
S￿2v1
W. While if bidder S unilaterally
20reduces demand, she wins one unit only at price v2
W and obtains a pro￿t of v1
S ￿v2
W. So bidder




Hence, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. When 2v1
W ￿ v2
S + v2
W, allowing resale eliminates bidder S￿ s incentive to uni-
laterally reduce demand in the auction.
The intuition for this result is that, when resale is not allowed, unilateral demand reduction
by bidder S requires bidder W to have a relatively low willingness to pay for the second unit,
because in this case bidder S can reduce the auction price by a large amount if she reduces
demand, even if bidder W bids his valuation for both units. But the possibility of resale increases
bidder W￿ s willingness to pay for the second unit; hence it may induce bidder S to increase her
demand (when bidder W does not reduce demand).25
Example 2. Assume v1
S = 10, v2
S = 6, v1
W = 4, v2
W = 0, and ￿ = 1
2, and assume that bidder W
bids his willingness to pay for both units. Without resale, bidder S prefers to unilaterally reduce
demand (in order to obtain a pro￿t of 10 rather than 8). With resale, bidder W is willing to
pay up to 5 ￿ c for each unit. Therefore, bidder S can win two units in the auction and obtain
pro￿t 6+2c. If bidder S unilaterally reduces demand instead, she wins one unit at price 5￿c in
the auction and buys the second unit in the resale market at price 5, paying the cost c. Hence,
she obtains a total pro￿t of 6. So bidder S strictly prefers not to reduce demand unilaterally
with resale.
8. Conclusions
It has been argued that resale should always be allowed because, by allowing bidders to exploit
gains from trade after the auction, it favors an e¢ cient allocation of the objects on sale in the
auction.
But resale also a⁄ects bidding strategies during an auction. Resale increases the willingness
to pay of a low-value bidder, because it gives him an option to resell in the aftermarket to a
high-value bidder and, at the same time, resale reduces the willingness to pay of a high-value
bidder, because it gives her an option to buy in the aftermarket a unit she loses in the auction.
When multiple units are on sale, this favors demand reduction by a high-value bidder. Therefore,
unlike in single-unit auctions, resale may reduce the seller￿ s revenue in multi-unit auctions.
25Therefore, if resale is allowed, even though joint demand reduction is an equilibrium, it may be more di¢ cult
to achieve it when a bidder has to adopt a unilateral behavior because she does not expect her opponent to
reduce demand and/or bidders are unable to coordinate their strategies. In this case, allowing resale may actually
increase the seller￿ s revenue.
21Moreover, our analysis also suggests that, if the resale market is not necessarily e¢ cient,
allowing resale may even reduce e¢ ciency, because the possibility of resale may induce bidders
to reduce demand during the auction, only then to ￿nd themselves unable to trade in the resale
market.
But when resale is allowed, the seller can always increase his revenue by bundling the units
on sale (rather than selling them separately). Moreover, bundling the units on sale at the same
time as allowing resale also yields a higher seller￿ s revenue than bundling the units on sale and
forbidding resale, or selling the units separately and forbidding resale (provided bidders are not
too asymmetric).
22A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. It is a weakly dominant strategy for both bidders to bid their valuation
for the ￿rst unit (e.g., Milgrom, 2004). Given that bidder S makes her weakly dominant bid
for the ￿rst unit, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bidder W to reduce demand and bid 0
for the second unit, because it is never pro￿table for him to win two units (since bidder S￿ s bid
for the ￿rst unit is higher than bidder W￿ s valuation for the second unit) and, therefore, his
second-unit￿ s bid can only a⁄ect the auction price.
When v1
W > v2
S, given that bidder W makes his weakly dominant bid for the ￿rst unit, it is
also a weakly dominant strategy for bidder S to reduce demand and bid 0 for the second unit,
because her second-unit￿ s bid can only a⁄ect the auction price. Therefore, the only equilibrium
that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies is for both bidders to jointly











Assume now that v2
S > v1




. If bidder S reduces demand, she wins one unit only at price 0 and her pro￿t is equal
to v1
S. If instead bidder S does not reduce demand and bids more than v1
W for the second unit,
she wins two units at price v1
W and her pro￿t is equal to v1
S + v2
S ￿ 2v1
W. Therefore, if and
only if v2
S > 2v1
W, bidder S strictly prefers not to reduce demand and to bid strictly more than
v1
W for the second unit. In this case, by Assumption 4 he bids v2
S for the second unit. So the
unique equilibrium that survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies and satis￿es













By contrast, if and only if 2v1
W ￿ v2
S, bidder S strictly prefers to reduce demand. So the











￿ i.e., joint demand reduction.
When 2v1
W ￿ v2
S there are also many other equilibria (that do not survive iterated deletion















. But all these equilibria are Pareto dominated,
from bidders￿point of view, by the equilibrium with x = 0 ￿ i.e., with joint demand reduction
and an auction price equal to 0 ￿ because both bidders win the same number of units in all
these equilibria and only the auction price di⁄ers. There may also be equilibria in which bidders




S, it is an equilibrium for
each bidder to bid his valuations for both units on sale. But when 2v1
W ￿ v2
S these equilibria are
Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with joint demand reduction and an auction price equal
to 0, because bidder S prefers to win one unit at price 0 rather than outbid bidder W. ￿
Proof of Lemma 2. First, we are going to show that no bidder has a pro￿table deviation
from the equilibrium described in the statement both when v2
S < v1
W and when v2
S ￿ v1
W. In the
candidate equilibrium, the auction price is equal to zero and both bidders win one unit. Notice
that bids b1
W ￿ ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W and b1
S ￿ ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W are not dominated, because they
are not higher than bidders￿willingness to pay.26
26Because with resale one bidder has a higher willingness to pay for the second unit than for the ￿rst unit,
bidding his willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit is not necessarily a dominant strategy anymore.
23Case (i): v1
W > v2
S. In this case no bidder resells the unit won in the auction and each
bidder i obtains a pro￿t equal to his valuation for the ￿rst unit, v1
i . In order to win a second
unit, a bidder has to raise the auction price for both units up to the price at which he will resell
the second unit in the aftermarket. This reduces his pro￿t. (And a bidders also earns a lower




W. In this case bidder W resells the unit won in the auction and bidder S







S ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W | {z }
resale surplus
= v1







In order to win two units, bidder S has to pay an auction price of 2 ￿ b1
W to outbid bidder W.


















Therefore, when condition A.1 is satis￿ed, bidder S prefers not deviate from the equilibrium













, which is also lower than ￿￿
S. So bidders S has no incentive to
deviate.
In the candidate equilibrium, bidder W obtains a pro￿t equal to the resale price at which he
resells one unit to bidder S in the aftermarket, that is:
￿￿
W = ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W:
In order to win two units (that he resells to bidder S in the aftermarket), bidder W has to pay
an auction price of 2 ￿ b1




























Therefore, when condition A.2 is satis￿ed, bidder W prefers not deviate from the equilibrium
described by winning two units. (Clearly, winning no units also yields a lower pro￿t for bidder
W.) So bidders W has no incentive to deviate either.
By Assumption 4, being indi⁄erent between any bid satisfying A.1 and A.2, bidders bid their
willingness to pay for the ￿rst unit. This proves that the strategies described in the statement
constitute an equilibrium satisfying Assumption 4.
Even when resale is allowed, the auction has other possible equilibria. However, by the same
arguments of Lemma 1, all other equilibria are Pareto dominated, from bidders￿point of view,
24by the equilibrium described, in which bidders jointly reduce demand and an auction price equal
to 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2, when resale is allowed bidders jointly reduce demand
and the seller￿ s revenue is equal to zero. By contrast, by Lemma 1, when resale is not allowed
the seller￿ s revenue is strictly positive when bidders do not reduce demand. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3. Follows from the discussion preceding the statement. ￿
Proof of Lemma 4. If bidder W wins the auction, he always resells the second unit to bidder S
at price ￿v1
S+(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W. Assume ￿rst that v2
S ￿ v1
W. Then bidder W also resells the ￿rst unit to
bidder S at price ￿v2
S+(1 ￿ ￿)v1

























for the two units in the auction, since this is the price at which she can buy them in the resale
market.
Assume now that v2
S < v1
W. In this case, any bidder who wins the auction resells one
unit in the aftermarket. If bidder W wins the auction at price p, he resells one unit at price
￿v1
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W and makes total pro￿t v1
W +￿v1
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W ￿p; while if bidder W loses the
auction, he buys one unit in the aftermarket at price ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W and makes total pro￿t
v1
W ￿￿v2
S ￿(1 ￿ ￿)v1












for the two units in the auction, which is the price at which he is indi⁄erent between winning
and losing. Similarly, if bidder S wins the auction, she resells one unit at price ￿v2
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v1
W
and makes total pro￿t v1
S+￿v2
S+(1 ￿ ￿)v1
W ￿p; while if bidder S loses the auction, she buys one
unit in the aftermarket at price ￿v1
S +(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W and makes total pro￿t v1
S ￿￿v1
S ￿(1 ￿ ￿)v2
W.












for the two units in
the auction, which is the price at which she is indi⁄erent between winning and losing. Hence,
both bidders have exactly the same willingness to pay.
Since it is a weakly dominant strategy in a second-price auction to bid one￿ s willingness to
















Assume now that resale is allowed and the units are sold separately. By Lemma 2, in this case
bidders jointly reduce demand and the seller￿ s revenue is equal to 0. This is lower than ￿B
R. ￿














, with: (1) the seller￿ s revenue without bundling and with resale,
￿NB
R , (2) the seller￿ s revenue with bundling and without resale, ￿B
NR, and (3) the seller￿ s revenue
without bundling and without resale, ￿NB
NR:
From Lemma 4 it follows that ￿B
R > ￿NB
R . From the discussion in Section 5.1, the seller￿ s











25This is clearly (weakly) lower than ￿B
R. (Notice that ￿B
R = ￿B





W.) Finally, from Lemma 1, the seller￿ s revenue without bundling and without





W if bidders do not reduce demand (i.e., if v2
S > 2v1
W);










































W), no bidder has a
pro￿table deviation from the bidding strategies bS =
￿
v1


















. First notice that bidders￿bids for the ￿rst unit are not dominated,
because they are not higher than bidders￿willingness to pay.
In the candidate equilibrium, the auction price is equal to zero and each bidder wins one of
the units on sale. Then, with probability p, bidder W resells his unit in the resale market at
price ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W. Hence, bidder S obtains a total expected pro￿t of:
￿￿
S = v1







By contrast, if bidder S outbids bidder W, she wins two units but raises the auction price for






















It follows that bidder S does not deviate from the strategies described if and only if:
￿￿
S > ￿0
























In the candidate equilibrium described, with probability p bidder W obtains a surplus equal
to the resale price at which he resells one unit to bidder S, and with probability (1 ￿ p) he
obtains a surplus equal to his valuation. hence, her total expected pro￿t is:
￿￿








In order to outbid bidder S and win two units, bidder W has to raises the auction price up to
v1






. In this case, her total expected pro￿t is:
￿0






























26It follows that bidder W does not deviate from the equilibrium described if and only if:
￿￿
W > ￿0
W , (1 ￿ p)v2
W + p￿v1


























> 1, bidder W never deviates from the strategies described. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 1, if v2
S > 2v1
W bidders do not reduce demand when resale






W) bidders reduce demand when resale is allowed.
In this case, each bidder wins one unit but, with probability (1 ￿ p), bidders are unable to trade
in the resale market and the allocation is ine¢ cient. ￿
Proof of Lemma 6. Let ￿v1
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v2
W = x and ￿v2
S + (1 ￿ ￿)v1
W = y, so that bidders￿
willingness to pay is:
1st unit 2nd unit
S x + c y + c
W y ￿ c x ￿ c
We are going to prove that, if bidder W does not reduce demand, then bidder S has no incentive
to reduce demand either.
Firstly assume that x > y. Let b1
W 2 [x + c; y + c] be bidder W￿ s bid for the ￿rst unit. Since
bidder W has a higher willingness to pay for the second unit and she does not reduce demand,
her bid for the second unit, b2
W, is never lower than b1
W. Bidder S can win two units in the
auction at price b1
W each. If instead bidder S unilaterally reduces demand, she wins one unit in
the auction at price b2
W and she purchases the second unit from bidder W in the resale market at
price y, paying also the resale cost c. Therefore, bidder S strictly prefers not to reduce demand.
Secondly assume that x < y. Since bidder W does not reduce demand, he bids bW =
(y ￿ c; x ￿ c). In this case, regardless of whether she reduces demand or not, bidder S always
wins one unit in the auction (because her bid for the ￿rst unit is higher than bidder W￿ s bid
for the second unit). If bidder S reduces demand, she buys the second unit in the resale market
at price y, and also pays the resale cost c. Therefore, bidder S has no incentive to unilaterally
reduce demand. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. Follows from Lemma 6 and the discussion preceding the statement. ￿
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